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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Richard Miller 
 
Hello, nice to meet you. Would you like some tea, perhaps a gun, tank, 
plane? 
Russia has continued to push foreign policy through the sale of weapons. Putin 
personally attended the opening of the 5th International Aerospace Show, MAKS 
2001, on 14 August where Russian equipment and arms deals were being 
offered to many putative customers, including more aircraft for India. (ITAR-
TASS, 1021 and 1109 GMT, 14 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0814, via World News 
Connection) Again, Russia is working these initiatives on a broad front around 
the world. 
 
Putin met with the head of Guinea, Lansana Conte, on 26 July and the two 
leaders signed friendship and military-technical cooperation agreements. While 
details of specific military transfers were not published, Guinea has agreed to 
serve as a conduit for Russian initiatives with other African countries and to 
cooperate with Moscow in aluminum and bauxite mining -- raw materials required 
for Russian military production. (INTERFAX, 1018 GMT, 27 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0727, via World News Connection) Following Kim Jong-Il's visit to Russia, 
diplomatic sources in Moscow indicated that Russia would recommence 
cooperation with North Korea in the military sphere. (INTERFAX, 0804 GMT, 9 
Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0809, via World News Connection)  
 
After an ASEAN regional forum, Moscow announced two new arms deals in that 
region. Malaysia concluded contracts for delivery of anti-tank missile systems 
and continued discussions for portable anti-aircraft missile systems, T-90S tanks 
and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, as well as modernization of previously 
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delivered equipment. (ITAR-TASS, 1611 GMT, 2 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0802, 
via World News Connection) Burma supposedly has concluded an agreement to 
buy a squadron of MiG-29 fighter jets and armaments worth $150 million. 
(INTERFAX, 1205 GMT, 9 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0809, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Both of these deals are consistent with the statement by Rosoboroneksport's 
director general, Andrey Belyaninov, that Russian priorities will shift to 
modernization of previously sold systems and to geographic expansion of arms 
exports into the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East and Latin America. (ITAR-
TASS, 1132 GMT, 15 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0815, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Following up on the Latin American and Middle East portions of the plan, the 
head of the Russian presidential administration, Aleksandr Voloshin, was in Cuba 
on 13-14 August to hold talks with Cuban defense officials. (ITAR-TASS, 0231 
GMT, 14 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0814, via World News Connection) Moscow 
also has announced that King Abdullah of Jordan will visit Moscow on 27 August 
to discuss Russia's training of Jordanian servicemen. The meeting between the 
Jordanian king and Putin is expected to reinforce military-technical cooperation 
agreements. (ITAR-TASS, 1431 GMT, 11 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0811, via 
World News Connection) 
 
US and NMD: More talks no action 
Several rounds of talks were held in recent weeks between Russian and US 
officials following the meeting of Presidents Bush and Putin in Genoa at the G-8 
Summit. First came the trip to Russia by Condoleezza Rice, President Bush's 
special assistant for national security affairs, immediately after the G-8 summit 
ended. She met with Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov and Security Council Chief 
Vladimir Rushaylo on 25-26 July. (ITAR-TASS, 0700 GMT, 26 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0726, and ITAR-TASS, 1658 GMT, 25 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0725, via 
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World News Connection) Following her visit, Russian and US defense officials 
met in Washington during the week of 6 August to discuss strategic stability 
issues and to finish laying the ground work for talks between the respective 
defense ministers. (ITAR-TASS, 0046 GMT, 9 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0809, via 
World News Connection) US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with 
Sergey Ivanov in Moscow on 13-14 August. All this movement, however, does 
not indicate necessarily increased Russian flexibility. Following three weeks of 
talks, no significant changes are evident concerning NMD and the 1972 ABM 
Treaty.  
 
Not only is the Russian stance still cemented in the contention that the 1972 
treaty is the cornerstone to strategic stability, but Moscow continues its campaign 
to elicit support from around the globe on this issue, while stating publicly that the 
opinions of third parties do not matter. Putin himself said that this is a delicate 
matter demanding precision in the interpretations of treaty provisions to avoid 
speculation and ambiguities, especially as there are "volunteer participants" who 
attempt to confuse the issue, based on self-serving interests. (TRUD, 24 Jul 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0723, via World News Connection) Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
told the ASEAN conference on 25 July that potential US abrogation of the ABM 
Treaty would probably provoke an arms race. (RIA, 0933 GMT, 25 Jul 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0725, via World News Connection) If a regional group like ASEAN 
does not prove to be an effective tool, there is always the cooperation treaty 
Moscow signed with Guinea. That document had an article calling for all states to 
abide by obligations under current treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms 
control and disarmament, especially the 1972 ABM treaty. (INTERFAX, 1018 
GMT, 27 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0727, via World News Connection) This author 
seriously doubts Guinea's "voluntary participation" in this campaign. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
GOVERNMENT 
Time for a change? 
The prospects of a cabinet reshuffle have been discussed regularly in the media 
and by politicians. In response, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov has said that 
"The question of replacements in the Russian government may arise in the fall, 
although at the current moment this issue is not being discussed." The sources of 
these rumors, he explains, may be any of the "various centers of influence and... 
forces pursuing their own interests. Well, let them play their game," he declares, 
"I don't see any reasons for alarm or concern." (INTERFAX, 0633 GMT, 9 Aug 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0809, via World News Connection) 
 
In particular, the left opposition blames the Kasyanov cabinet for making "a 
number of decisions which objectively increase the likelihood of social upheaval." 
These decisions include housing and utilities reforms, electricity sector reforms, 
transport ministry reforms and privatization. 
 
A trial run of the new housing and utilities system (in which the "rich," individuals 
with a monthly income of more than 6,000 rubles, will pay 100 percent of the 
utilities bills and poorer residents will receive a partial subsidy) starts in the 
Zelenograd rayon of Moscow on 1 October. Zelenograd is one of the poorer 
Moscow rayoni, and the theory is that if the new payment system works there, it 
will work elsewhere in the Russian capital. The Communists expect the system to 
plunge Russia into darkness and leave it without heating this winter. The left 
opposition also claims that higher prices associated with the electricity and 
transport system reforms will shift the entire burden of payments from the 
"magnates" to the ordinary Russian citizens. 
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The Communists are hoping that one of their own, Mikhail Prusak (at present 
governor of the Novgorod region), will replace Kasyanov. "He's young, but an 
experienced politician and effective manager with a good record and international 
profile," they say. Another possible candidate is Yuri Zaostrovtsev, FSB deputy 
director for economic issues. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 9 Aug 01; via Johnson's 
Russia List, and ORT, 16 Aug 01; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
REGIONS 
Running cold... 
The prospects of cold and darkness are not that far off the mark for some of 
Russia's regions. Electricity and heat prices are expected to go up by 30-40 
percent - partly as a result of a matching prospective increase by the coal 
industry and a recent doubling of rail tariffs. The government seems to be taking 
three directions for dealing with the problem: allocating 20 billion rubles from the 
federal budget (R10 billion to settle federal consumers' debts to suppliers, R5 
billion to the Unified Energy Systems Russian Joint Stock Company [UES RAO] 
in the form of a budget loan to purchase fuel, and R5 billion to the regions), 
including indexing in the 2002 budget to enable the power industry to increase 
loans, and instituting criminal proceedings against those (such as former Spassk-
Dalniy Mayor Vladimir Ashikhim) suspected of "negligent handling of fuel 
supplies" and abuse of power. (RIA, 0126 GMT, 14 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-
0814, and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0810, via 
World News Connection) 
 
...and hot 
Sadly, the fears of the cold are here while the summer heat is still wreaking 
havoc in its own way. Some Russians, trying to escape the heat wave by 
swimming, caught viruses spread through the bacteria-infested water. Others - 
286 as of 1 August, mostly drunk -- have drowned in Moscow alone. (ORT; via 
www.ortv.ru) 
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Back in the USSR 
In other regional news, Volgograd Governor Nikolai Maksyuta related that he is 
"flooded with letters and requests to return to the city its historical name." He is 
referring, of course, not to the city's original name - Tsaritsyn - but to the one 
made famous by the "glorious" and "extraordinary" battle of Stalingrad. Maksyuta 
is recommending that a referendum be held on this topic. 
 
MEDIA 
All TV channels are equal; here's hoping that some aren't more equal than 
others 
On 13 August, President Putin signed a decree creating a federal unitary 
enterprise, the "Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network" (RTRS). 
According to the presidential press service, the new company will seek "to 
improve the operation of the television and radio program distribution network in 
the Russian Federation and create a single production and technological 
complex on the basis of state television and radio broadcasting networks."  
 
Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Aleksey Kudrin explained 
that "the coverage of the country's whole territory with information services is an 
essential feature of democracy and one of the most important functions of the 
federal budget." Moreover, with the federal funds which will be allocated, the 
RTRS -- formed from "federal state unitary enterprises" including the Main Center 
for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Main Center for the Control of 
Broadcasting Networks, and parts of the All-Russian State Television and Radio 
Broadcasting Company (VGTRK) -- will be able at least partially to "recover debts 
and to improve the quality of television programs." 
 
This new entity will fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for the Press, Radio 
and Television and Mass Communications. A director-general of the RTRS will 
be appointed in the near future. According to Press Minister Mikhail Lesin, the 
 7 
change will allow for equality for all of the television channels - previously, the 
VGTRK was both a provider and a competitor to major channels. (ITAR-TASS, 
1626 GMT, 13 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0813, via World News Connection, and 
IZVESTIYA, 15 Aug 01; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Richard Miller 
 
New maritime doctrine signed 
President Putin used Russia's Navy Day celebrations as a backdrop to sign and 
publish the new Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the period up to 
2020. (Russian text available NVO 3 August 2001) Some commentators have 
criticized the doctrine as a weak and ineffectual document, claiming that it would 
do little or nothing to invigorate the Russian Navy. (TRUD, 1 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0801, via World News Connection) What many critics may be missing is 
that this document really represents a broader maritime policy, covering the full 
spectrum of maritime activities, rather than a specific naval-military doctrine 
focused on the Russian Navy, as anticipated by many. 
 
The new doctrine outlines general principles and fundamentals of national 
maritime strength and policy. Thus, it includes the exploitation of other fishing 
and natural ocean resources, viable (military and commercial) shipbuilding 
industries, law enforcement, environmental protection, scientific exploration, 
safety at sea, and many other aspects of maritime policy. The Russian Navy is 
discussed, but again only in broad terms that address regional focus. There are 
no specific threat assessments or naval planning strategies to which one can 
point. Only a passing reference in this vein is to be found in the discussion 
concerning the Atlantic/Mediterranean region, in the context of which a concern 
is voiced about NATO expansion eastward. However, Russia's preoccupation 
with this issue has been expressed so often in other venues that its omission in 
 8 
the new maritime doctrine would have been more noteworthy than the bland 
reference it contains.  
 
In fact, it has been suggested that the new doctrine is merely a reincarnation of 
(Russian Navy commander in chief) Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov's Ph.D. 
dissertation from the summer of 2000. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 3 Aug 
01) The traces of Kuroedov's imprimatur carry further weight in view of the heavy 
emphasis on the international Law of the Sea, Russia's development and use of 
its Exclusive Economic Zone, and development of the shipping industry. A review 
of statements by senior Russian officials over the past 18 months concerning 
maritime and naval issues show that Kuroedov was the only officer to address 
publicly these aspects of maritime power. In fact, some of his speeches centered 
exclusively on these themes.  
 
Considering Russia's decade of decline since the fall of the Soviet Union, this 
doctrine probably constitutes a realistic starting point to define its overall maritime 
interests for the next two decades. Whether the document will have any 
significant or lasting impact remains to be seen. How the Russian Navy develops 
relative to the remainder of the armed forces within the ongoing military reform 
efforts also constitutes an open question. If the Navy, and various sectors of 
Russia's maritime industries, were to be given greater priority in government 
funding and attention, the new doctrine might be viewed as viable Russian policy 
rather than merely another piece of paper. Financial support for national maritime 
policy is mentioned in the document; however, it does so in a somewhat 
contradictory manner. It refers to attracting non-governmental forms of financing 
and international investment to enhance Russia's maritime interests. On the 
other hand, it calls for limiting access of foreign capital to maritime activities that 
ultimately affect the security of the Russian Federation. This will be a difficult 
balancing act to maintain. 
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As far as the Russian Navy itself is concerned, the new doctrine coincides with 
the first anniversary of the Kursk disaster and the efforts to raise the submarine's 
hull from the bottom of the Barents Sea. Prior to the Kursk's sinking, the Navy 
apparently had held a special place in President Putin's heart. From the time of 
his original appointment as prime minister, his statements concerning the world 
power and prestige emanating from naval strength were revealing. Moreover, 
Putin's involvement in naval matters during that period, and in the first seven 
months of his presidency, was striking, considering the scope of other, more 
pressing, problems confronting him. His "Peter the Great view" of global naval 
power at that time was particularly notable since the creation of a huge "blue 
water navy" probably constitutes the least affordable and least essential form of 
military capability currently required for Russian security needs. Whether his 
views on naval power prevail after the international and domestic embarrassment 
suffered as a result of the Kursk fiasco remains to be seen. One could argue this 
new doctrine constitutes a diminished version of what it might have been had the 
Kursk incident not occurred. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
To Russia with love? 
This past month has seen a flurry of reports, statements and press releases 
touting the admittedly superb performance of the Ukrainian economy. With 
industrial output up 17.9% over last year, the wheat harvest far outpacing last 
year's paltry numbers, the gross domestic product up over 10% and the federal 
bank's national reserves the highest they've been since 1998, Ukraine's domestic 
future shouldn't look anything but rosy. Add to this NATO's increased attention to 
Ukraine and its inclusion in the European Union's Macedonian negotiations, and 
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it would seem that Ukraine should be able finally to remove the "newly" from its 
designation as a "newly independent state."  
 
But these numbers and foreign policy coups, while impressive, don't begin to tell 
the true story of Ukraine as it exists today. In reality, it is a country still attempting 
to discover its identity, while it seems to become more and more racked each 
day with internal political conflict. It is led by a president who, it seems, at least 
had knowledge of a number of criminal acts, and an opposition that can't stop 
squabbling long enough to unite to counterbalance his enormous power. It is 
clearly a state in flux. How it will emerge in one, two or ten years is anyone's 
guess. What is clear, however, is that today new accusations of corruption 
against President Leonid Kuchma and his supporters appear on a regular basis. 
And with each accusation, Kuchma moves closer to his biggest potential 
protector, President Vladimir Putin of Russia. 
 
Despite suggestions in one Russian newspaper that the EU has had some 
success at pressuring Ukraine "to distance itself from Moscow," the opposite 
actually appears to be true. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 1 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0801, via World News Connection) There can be no two better examples of 
this than the recent Russian investigation of Yulia Tymoshenko and the inclusion 
of LUKoil in ceremonies marking a milestone in the construction of the Odesa-
Brody pipeline. 
 
United against Tymoshenko ... 
Just weeks ago, Russian prosecutors announced that they had built a case 
against Yulia Tymoshenko and suggested that she was complicit in bribing 
Colonel General Georgy Oleinik, a Russian army official. Oleinik is currently 
charged in Russia with laundering $450 million through the Ukrainian energy firm 
run by Tymoshenko and her husband in the mid-1990s. Russian officials admit 
that Tymoshenko probably never met Oleinik and did not give him a bribe herself. 
They suggest, however, that she ordered an unnamed individual to do so. 
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Prosecutors have suggested also that Tymoshenko violated customs laws in 
1995 when she attempted to carry $100,000 on board a plane traveling from 
Russia to Ukraine. Pursuant to CIS and bilateral legal agreements, Russian 
prosecutors have handed over both cases to Ukrainian officials for prosecution. 
 
Tymoshenko, of course, rejects these charges and instead finds nothing more 
than politics behind the move. "I am sure," she said, "that no one at the top level 
in Ukraine and Russia is interested in any legal argument supporting these 
charges. I think what matters is the scandal and the pretext to discredit that 
Ukrainian opposition." (UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 8 Aug 01; via lexis-
nexis) Tymoshenko also noted the large lapse in time between the named 
customs infraction in 1995 and its prosecution in 2001. It cannot be lost on 
Tymoshenko also that these charges were handed over to Ukrainian authorities 
after Ukrainian attempts to charge her with numerous other crimes began to 
unravel. 
 
Of course, any realist must consider that Yulia Tymoshenko may be guilty of 
something. This same realist also must admit, however, that just about every 
high-profile businessperson in Ukraine in the 1990s probably was guilty of 
something. Yet, these other individuals remain largely untouched by Ukrainian 
prosecutors. In fact, many of them hold positions within Kuchma's administration. 
And certainly, none of them has been investigated by Russian prosecutors -- 
even though many reportedly have deep and complicated connections with 
Russian enterprises. 
 
But Tymoshenko is a vocal opponent of Kuchma. These other individuals are not. 
So, when Ukrainian prosecutors couldn't get the job done, Russian prosecutors 
took a turn. The development is not surprising given Kuchma's obvious dislike of 
his loudest opponent; it is disarming, however, for its demonstration of the true 
depth of cooperation between Ukrainian and Russian law officers. 
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The biggest irony in all of this is that Tymoshenko is far from the most popular 
opposition figure in Ukraine. A 16 August poll by the Kyiv International Institute 
for Sociology and the SocioPolis company found her trailing former Prime 
Minister Viktor Yushchenko (supported by 26% of those polled), Communist 
leader Petro Symonenko (21%), current Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh (9.5%) 
and four others. Tymoshenko managed to win the support of only 6% of those 
polled. It's too bad these numbers weren't publicized before Russian officials 
announced their case against Tymoshenko. They might have saved themselves 
a lot of work. 
 
A pipeline for Russian oil? 
Unlike the justice ministries, there has never been any question of the level of 
cooperation between energy industry officials in Ukraine and Russia. But there 
was one bright spot -- the Odesa-Brody pipeline. This pipeline was to be 
Ukraine's path to independence from Russian pressure over energy issues. 
Officials hoped that it would pump oil from the Caspian to Europe, making 
Ukraine an important actor in European energy matters. As recently as 5 June 
Kuchma said, "We will complete the Odesa-Brody [segment of the pipeline] and 
terminal this year, and we need joint efforts to ensure that ... Caspian crude oil is 
transported to Poland and Western Europe." On that same day, Polish President 
Kwasniewski told reporters that Poland was discussing the pipeline "with various 
consortiums, including international consortiums, and we are seeking the 
assistance of the European Union." (UKRAINIAN NEWS, 5 Jun 01; via ISI 
Emerging Markets) 
 
But that was then. And this is very much now. At a 19 August ceremony marking 
the completion of the main Ukrainian section of the pipeline, there were no 
Western oil companies present, no promises of oil to be shipped through the 
pipeline from the Caspian, no promises of much of anything. Ukraine's internal 
political problems, Russian opposition to European involvement in the project 
and an increase in Western support for the alternative Baku-Ceyhan pipeline all 
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have combined to leave the Ukrainian pipeline and oil terminal with little support. 
Of course, Ukrainian politicians still talk regularly of the involvement of 
international consortia (the latest apparently being led by the Shell Corporation), 
but so far with limited actual results. As usual, Russia has been quick to sense 
the vacuum and has stepped in rapidly to fill the void. 
 
At the 19 August ceremony, LUKoil President Vagit Alikperov stood proudly near 
Kuchma and announced that his company "will seriously work to ensure that 
LUKoil's oil goes through this oil terminal." (UNIAN, 1000 GMT, 19 Aug 01; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets) No, this is not exactly what was envisioned 
originally for this pipeline, which was pointed to so many times as the road to 
Ukraine's independence. Strangely, as he stood by Alikperov, Kuchma continued 
to insist that the pipeline would lay "the foundation of Ukrainian independence." 
But if Ukraine remains reliant on Russian oil for this pipeline, how is it becoming 
independent? Maybe Kuchma knows, but he just doesn't feel like telling us. 
Regardless, clearly he sees no need to worry about the pressure exerted by 
LUKoil. That company, he announced, "has come to our land for a long time, 
forever." (ITAR-TASS, 1031 EST, 19 Aug 01; via lexis-nexis) How comforting. 
 
In the midst of all this, of course, various Ukrainian politicians have made bold 
statements about the need to protect Ukrainian national interests, and strongly 
criticized Kuchma's actions. But somehow, those politicians don't seem to be 
able to do very much about it. 
 
BELARUS 
The West is coming! The West is coming! 
Let no one say Alyaksandr Lukashenka doesn't prepare for all eventualities in 
life. Given his domination over the media, elimination of various opposition 
members and control of the KGB, it would seem that Lukashenka would have 
little to fear in the upcoming 9 September presidential poll. Despite a remarkable 
demonstration of unity by Belarusian opposition members behind union head 
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Vladimir Goncharik, one has to wonder how Goncharik can overcome the votes 
for Lukashenka brought in by collective farm managers, tax police and other 
enforcement agencies. Still, the opposition has been aggressive and effective at 
organizing its members. Just a few days ago, over 1,000 persons attended a 
congress in support of Goncharik -- an impressive turnout from a population 
riddled with fear. So, the president has decided to take precautions, just in case. 
He has stepped up activity against all groups opposing him: Computers, 
newspapers and ink for printing presses have been confiscated, while police 
routinely question and "warn" members of the opposition against continuing their 
activity. These "warnings" have added weight given the newly discovered 
existence of so-called "death squads." The squads, according to recent 
Belarusian defectors from the prosecutor's office, have been responsible for the 
disappearances of over 30 persons opposing Lukashenka. (See THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 1 Aug 01, for further background.) 
 
Even more worrisome than the stepped-up confiscation of property and warnings 
is a recent statement by the justice ministry. The coalition created to support 
Goncharik, the ministry announced, "contradicts the Constitution of the Republic 
of Belarus." Furthermore, according to the statement, the KGB "believes that the 
individuals who have signed the agreement are in fact stating their intentions to 
seize state power ... at any cost." (BELAPAN, 17 Aug 01; via BBC Monitoring) In 
other words, it would not be advisable to be one of those who have signed the 
agreement. 
 
Nevertheless, Goncharik and his supporters are continuing with their campaign. 
And Lukashenka is stepping up the pressure even further. On 31 July, the 
president began making repeated statements about an impending coup -- 
organized "jointly by the opposition and the West." Therefore, if for some 
inconceivable reason the poll does not end with his victory, Lukashenka reserves 
the right to protect his position with force. If, as he expects, thousands of West-
sponsored opposition members storm his residence, he will depend on his 
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"Alpha" and "Almaz" special forces to protect him. "There will be no Kostunica in 
Belarus," he announced. "They [the supposed coup-plotters] know perfectly well I 
will be defending myself. I will not be sitting in a bunker like Milosevic. I am not 
afraid of anybody." (WASHINGTON POST, 15 Aug 01) 
 
This is assuming, of course, that the election does not end as Lukashenka plans, 
which is difficult to believe. More likely, it is Goncharik who should be gathering 
his own "Almaz" force around him; it is he who is continually followed and 
"warned." But in a sad commentary on Belarusian life, Goncharik has said that 
he has gotten used to these warnings. Moreover, he is comforted by the fact that 
"at least my disappearance would not go unnoticed." (THE TIMES, 18 Aug 01; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA  
Maskhadov's secret correspondence 
A Grani-ru reporter, Andrei Smirnov, met with officials of the Chechen foreign 
ministry and a leading commander who told him that secret negotiations between 
Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov and the Russian presidential 
administration had been conducted by letter from January to March 2001. The 
correspondence was initiated by the Russian side, which suggested that Russia 
could join forces with Maskhadov against the criminal elements, offered a 
scheme for power-sharing, and mentioned the possibility of a referendum on 
Chechnya's status. The Russian side also demanded that Maskhadov hand over 
terrorists. The Chechen side asked for the names of the "terrorists" Russia 
wanted. There was no response to this question, but the correspondence 
continued. The Russian side agreed to recognize Maskhadov as the legitimate 
president, to legitimize Chechen armed forces, and to form joint units. In return 
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the Russians asked that the Chechen side give up claims to independence and 
allow 40,000 Russian troops to remain on bases in Chechnya. According to the 
field commander, Maskhadov refused these terms and asked that negotiations 
become public. At that point, in March 2001, all contacts between Putin and 
Maskhadov ceased. (GRANI.RU, 16 Aug 01) 
 
Smirnov comments that there is little cohesion among the Russian authorities. 
Akhmad Kadyrov, the head of the Russian-installed administration, approached 
Shamil Basaev. At one point General Troshev advocated starting talks with 
Ruslan Gelaev. Kazantsev favors talks with Maskhadov; whereas, Baranov, 
Kvashnin and Baluevski oppose all negotiations.  
 
In July, Putin met with Aslambek Aslakhanov, the Chechen representative to the 
Duma, who advocated negotiations with Maskhadov. Then, on 26 July, Putin met 
with Kvashnin. After the meeting, the head of the general staff relayed Putin's 
comment: "Tell everyone -- there are no behind the scenes negotiations." 
(LENTA.RU, 26 Jul 01) 
 
Soldier ordered to attack own position 
A soldier in the Russian army, Mekhak Melkonyan, related the following to 
Vyacheslav Izmailov of Novaya gazeta. (9 Aug 01)  
 
"Our company was located in Roshni-yurt. The senior lieutenant, Vadim 
Remizov, ordered us to blow up our own checkpoint, so that it could be blamed 
on the Chechens and we could shoot at them. I refused to do this. Then I was 
sent to Gekhi, the battalion headquarters, where I was thrown into the maw of the 
contract soldiers (otdan na raztirzaniye kontraktinikam). They and the major -- 
the deputy commanding officer of the battalion - abused me. They stripped me 
naked, beat me, cut into my body, and poured salt into the wounds. They 
promised to kill me and write it off as a combat death."  
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Melkonyan escaped with help from fellow soldiers who feared for his life, 
Chechen civilians who clothed him, helped him get to Nazran and notified 
Izmailov. In Nazran he was cared for by the Memorial office, where he was 
examined by medics and by the Memorial activist Andrei Mironov, who 
corroborated that he saw signs of torture on Melkonyan's body. After reading 
Izmailov's 9 August report, MVD Colonel-General Vyacheslav Tikhomirov opened 
an investigation into the case. Melkonyan has been transferred by the MVD to 
Rostov. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 13 Aug 01) 
 
Novaya gazeta honors Ustinov, Yastrzhembsky, and the Navy 
A monthly rating of lies awarded the top prize, a windmill, to General Prosecutor 
Vladimir Ustinov for his purported discovery of an armed Wahhabi conspiracy to 
stage a coup d'état in the North Caucasian Republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and 
Karachevo-Cherkessia. (NOVAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 01)  
 
Ustinov, who was sent to Chechnya to check into human rights violations, arrived 
in Khankala military base on 16 August. Instead of investigating wrongdoing by 
the federal forces, he announced that a Wahhabi conspiracy had been 
discovered in two nearby republics.  
 
This news came as a surprise to the governments of the republics. The 
prosecutor's office in Kabardino-Balkaria circulated an urgent announcement that 
it was not aware of any attempts at armed conspiracy or a coup d'état. According 
to the republican press release quoted by polit.ru on 17 August: "At present the 
situation in Kabardino-Balkaria is stable, and is completely controlled by the 
leadership of the republic and its law-enforcement agencies."  
 
Second prize, an answering machine equipped with stock phrases, goes to 
presidential spokesman Sergei Yastrzhembsky for first denying fighting in 
Vedeno and then characterizing it as merely ornamental, "an imitation of bandit 
activity." (NOVAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 01) According to a 15 August report by 
 18 
Chechenpress (via Chechnya-sl) the Chechen forces had shot down a military 
transport helicopter, taken control of the Vedeno district center and surrounded 
the Russian administration building. The newspaper Kommersant confirmed that 
a Russian MI-24 helicopter did crash, that phone lines to Vedeno were down, 
and that the head of the district administration could not be reached. 
(KOMMERSANT, 17 Aug 01; What the Papers Say, via ISI Emerging Markets) 
The Internet wire service, grani.ru, commented on 17 August that the Chechens' 
ability to capture and hold most of the Vedeno region for several days refutes the 
Kremlin's line that the Chechen resistance is not capable of active combat action.  
 
Third prize for lying, a "harmless tour to the safe raising of the torpedoes from the 
Kursk," goes to the Press Service of the Navy. For a year the Navy denied that 
there were torpedoes on the Kursk. Now that some have been discovered, the 
Navy has characterized them as "harmless." (NOVAYA GAZETA, 20 Aug 01) 
 
Provokatsia against rights defenders 
On 9 August, ITAR-TASS publicized excerpts of what purported to be a letter 
from Aslan Maskhadov to his "agents" among human rights activists in 
Ingushetia. Maskhadov thanks the human rights activists for "making a giant 
contribution to the national struggle against kaffirs (heathens) and traitors to the 
nation." According to this purported "letter," Maskhadov's plans included 
providing information to Western and Russian media about atrocities committed 
in Chechnya, expanding the hunger strike among Chechen refugees and 
"searching for people ready to sacrifice themselves and doomed to death 
because of illnesses -- tuberculosis, cancer -- and prepare them for self-
immolation," in return for financial compensation. Such steps should be 
coordinated with the editors of Novaya gazeta. If taken seriously the letter would 
incriminate Memorial and Novaya gazeta in taking direction and money from 
Maskhadov. 
 
 19 
It's interesting that "Maskhadov" in his "letter" does not ask his "agents" to 
manufacture false reports of atrocities. The phrasing presumes that the atrocities 
are real, and that the agents' work is to report them!  
 
Memorial, to whose activists the "letter" was addressed, called it a fake. 
(POLIT.RU, 10 Aug 01) Writing on behalf of the board of directors of Memorial, 
Alexander Cherkasov pointed out that the letter was addressed to two persons, 
one of whom is no longer affiliated with Memorial, while the other has been living 
near Moscow for over a year. Neither has been working in Ingushetia. Wouldn't 
Maskhadov know his agents' addresses? Memorial agrees with ITAR-TASS in 
one respect only: The "letter" came to light as a result of a "special operation." 
This provokatsia is only the latest in a whole propaganda campaign conducted by 
the authorities against Memorial and other human rights groups. A similar 
episode occurred in June when the presidential authority on human rights, V. 
Kartashkin, accused Memorial of "anti-state activity." (See also THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 31 Jul 01) 
 
Novaya gazeta published a mocking front page editorial by Boris Kagarlitsky on 
16 August. He remarked that the press already had reported all the activities 
mentioned in the letter. So why is Maskhadov writing? "It turns out that 
Maskhadov wrote a letter to persons on his payroll only to let them know that he 
has been paying for their services. Consequently, one is to believe that persons 
whom Maskhadov had bought off did not know that they had been bought off 
until Maskhadov sent them the letter." Kagarlitsky comments that the letter is 
such a bad forgery that one starts to pity the security services and fear for the 
country: "Can it be that all competent cadres went over to the private sector? Or 
were promoted to the Kremlin?"  
 
As Kagarlitsky comments, the most revealing aspect of the letter is the glimpse 
into the psychology of the agents who concocted it. "The persons who authored 
'Maskhadov's letter' expressed their own ideas about life ... The authors are 
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certain: Everything in this world can be bought and sold." If offered the right sum, 
a person (especially a terminally ill person) would perform self-immolation.  
 
All of this tempts one to ask: What would FSB officers who were "ready to 
sacrifice themselves and doomed to death because of illnesses" charge for self-
immolation?  
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Atmosphere at informal summit masks the reality of Russia's growing influence  
The CIS presidents held an informal summit early at the beginning of August in 
the Russian resort of Sochi. Arranged by Russian President Vladimir Putin, the 
gathering was intended to be a launching pad for official talks, which are to be 
held in November. 
 
Meeting both individually and as a group with President Putin, the Central Asian 
leaders focused on important problems, such as the threat posed by Islamic 
fundamentalism and drug trafficking. However, it is clear that the subjects 
discussed pale in comparison with the larger topic at hand, that is Russia's 
increasing influence and power in the Central Asian and Caucasus regions. 
 
The status of the Caspian Sea -- specifically, the allocation of its valuable oil 
reserves -- remains a contentious issue for all of the littoral states, including 
Russia. In an attempt to resolve long-standing disputes, Kazakh President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev held private talks with Putin. The problems between these 
two countries relate to the Caspian Sea Pipeline consortium, the taxation of 
Kazakh oil traversing Russian territory, and the drawing of a territorial dividing 
line in the Caspian itself. Putin's spokesman for this meeting, Deputy Head of the 
Presidential Administration Sergey Prikhodko, said that Russia and Kazakhstan 
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would move forward in development plans, and that "Russia's and Kazakhstan's 
principled positions on the division of the Caspian Sea resources coincide." 
(FINANCIAL TIMES, 2 Aug 01; via BBC Monitoring Service) 
 
Whilst there were no official statements on the topic from the summit, there were 
several developments of note with regard to the Collective Security Treaty in the 
immediate aftermath of the talks. On 3 August, Nezavisimaya gazeta reported 
that the CIS countries had begun force deployments in the region. Initially, an 
operations group was sent to Bishkek in order to prepare a report on the situation 
in Central Asia. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 3 Aug 01; via BBC Monitoring 
Service) Then, the Kyrgyz defense ministry reported on 7 August that the 
regional headquarters of the combined rapid reaction force, based in Bishkek, 
had become active. Whilst it is currently engaged in administrative functions, 
command exercises will be carried out in the near future. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 
Kyrgyzstan Daily Digest, 7 Aug 01; via Eurasianet) 
 
Though such developments and statements may look innocuous, deeper 
analysis reveals that Russia is steadily increasing its sphere of influence.  
 
President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan informed President Putin at the Sochi talks 
that the Kyrgyz constitution may be amended to make Russian an official 
language as early as September -- this despite the fact that the Russian minority 
population of Central Asia has decreased massively in recent months and years.  
 
Meanwhile, the fact that Turkmen President Saparmyrat Niyazov did not travel to 
the summit received little press coverage. Official Turkmen sources explained 
that the president would spend the weekend preparing his new book, Rukhnana 
(Spirituality), for publication. This is not the first occasion at which he has been 
absent. Niyazov did not appear at the CIS summit held in Minsk last June, nor is 
he expected to travel to the November meetings. (CENTRAL EURASIA DAILY 
REPORT, Turkmenistan, 30 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0730, via World News 
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Connection) No further official explanation has been given for Niyazov's absence, 
but Turkmenistan is known to be at odds with the Russian plan for the division of 
the Caspian Sea. Niyazov's absence can be taken as implicit disapproval of 
Russian hegemonism. Tellingly, Turkmenistan has also remained outside the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
 
Russian neo-imperialism is becoming evermore obvious, to the extent that even 
statements from the government-controlled press are explicit. An NTV report 
said: " Our TV Company learned today that Putin will sign a decree on setting up 
special armed formations within the framework of the CIS Collective Security 
Treaty. As a matter of fact, this means that a new political and military bloc will be 
set up following the pattern of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This time 
however, it will be set up on the territory of former Soviet Republics."(NTV 
INTERNATIONAL, 7 Aug 01; via BBC Monitoring Service) [Italics added] Implicit 
in that statement is the fact that Russia will be the major power, and that Russian 
officers and officials will hold all senior posts. In the same report, Valeriy 
Nikolaev, who has been nominated for the position of secretary general of the 
Collective Security Council, added that he believed the treaty would ensure 
political as well as military security, and that the political component is of "priority 
importance" to the CIS. (NTV INTERNATIONAL, 7 Aug 01; via BBC Monitoring 
Service)  
 
RFE/RL recently argued that the economic agreements between the CIS 
countries were designed to promote Russian control. Furthermore, it pointed out 
that President Putin's description of the CIS as a "regional organization" 
demonstrates that he does not regard the former Soviet states as sovereign 
republics. ("Back to the USSR?," RFE/RL ANALYSIS, 6 Aug 01)  
 
The leaders of Central Asia, excepting President Niyazov, have assumed for 
some time that, if they wish to survive, they must toe the Russian line. If this 
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assumption continues to hold, the only question is how much longer they will 
retain any semblance of independence. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Maria Metcalf 
 
Taking a stance means everything 
Six months ago it seemed likely that NATO would adopt a fairly timid approach to 
enlarging the alliance. Slovenia was becoming the poster child of the perfect 
NATO candidate, economically secure, no Russian objections, European support 
... an all-around politically safe decision. However, since US President George 
W. Bush came to office it has become increasingly likely that some or all of the 
Baltic states will be invited into the alliance at the 2002 NATO Summit in Prague. 
President Bush's June speech in Warsaw containing a US commitment to invite 
new members to join NATO at the next summit set the tone for Baltic optimism. 
This was followed by an 18 July US Senate resolution, marking Estonia's, 
Latvia's and Lithuania's 10th anniversary of freedom from Soviet rule, that 
expressed Congressional support of the Baltic security concerns and of their 
sovereign right to choose their own security arrangements. 
 
Until recently, it was unclear whether any of the three major European allies 
would support Baltic accession to NATO. It has been expected that London 
would follow the US lead, but Paris and Berlin had been Baltosceptics regarding 
as far as NATO enlargement was concerned. However, during his visit to Estonia 
and Latvia on 27-28 July, France's president, Jacques Chirac, announced French 
support of Baltic aspirations to NATO membership, declaring "Each country has 
its sovereign right to choose what organization it wants to join, and I don't see a 
possibility how such a choice can be contested." (BNS, 1600 GMT, 27 Jul 01; 
FBIS-SOV-2001-0728, via World News Connection) 
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The Baltic states were not the last destination on President Chirac's itinerary. He 
traveled on to Moscow, where on 31 July he reiterated to President Putin that the 
Baltic states have the right to join NATO. Chirac's move marks a significant and 
perhaps decisive turn of events for Baltic NATO hopefuls. Until now, Germany 
had been very careful to avoid a commitment regarding NATO membership for 
the Baltic republics. Berlin feared a hitch in its good relations with Russia. Now, 
with US leadership and France's support for Baltic accession to NATO, Germany 
is unlikely to hold out against Baltic membership.  
 
This turn of events reinforces the importance of making and sticking to a clear 
and focused foreign policy objective. As long as the US remains committed to 
this objective, it is likely that the Baltic states soon will become NATO allies. 
 
Moreover, President Chirac proclaimed the Baltic countries as ready to join the 
European Union. He underscored France's "moral obligation" to support Latvia 
and focused on Estonian progress toward integration, saying that he expected 
Estonia to conclude accession talks by the end of 2002. He stated, "Estonia has 
no need for French support, Estonia's reform policy has been excellent and it is 
therefore among the front-runners." (BNS, 1042 GMT, 28 Jul 01; FBIS-SOV-
2001-0728, via World News Network)  
 
Meanwhile, 3 August marked the end of the informal get-together of ten of the 
leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Sochi. According to 
Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, CIS leaders hope to build a 
confederation of 12 of the 15 former USSR republics (minus the three Baltic 
states). Three days later, Lukashenka announced his concern about supposed 
military activity in neighboring states. With obvious reference to the Baltic 
republics, he stated, "we cannot help noticing alarming trends in the world and in 
the European region...armed forces of foreign states constantly accelerate 
military training in the immediate proximity of the republic's state border." 
(INTERFAX, 1121 GMT, 6 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0806, via World News 
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Connection) Not coincidentally, he also announced that, beginning on 26 August, 
Belarus will conduct the largest tactical military exercise ("Neman-2001") in its 
short history. The exercise will focus on the troops' ability to repulse an armed 
attack. In light of the much-proclaimed "Union" between Belarus and Russia, 
Lukashenka is not precisely an independent or objective party where the Baltic 
states are concerned. 
 
Russia's continued campaign  
Russia continues its campaign of calling attention to the alleged discrimination 
against Russians in Latvia and Estonia. On 31 July, the Russian foreign 
ministry's official spokesman, Aleksandr Yakovenko, claimed that witnesses had 
seen drunk Estonian soldiers beating non-Estonians because they were 
speaking Russian. Moreover, no sooner had Latvian President Vaira Vike-
Freiberga pointed out the great potential for positive relations with Russia, 
stating, "we are ready to operate without emotions and reproaches," (LETA, 0722 
GMT, 10 Aug 01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0810, via World News Connection) then 
Moscow created a provocation. Aleksandr Perelygin, an advisor to Moscow's 
mayor, was included in the Moscow city delegation that was to visit Riga for the 
city's 800th anniversary celebration. Perelygin is notorious for his agitation on 
behalf of the Russian-speaking population in Latvia; however, he is also a 
member of Moscow's working group for cooperation with Riga. Latvia denied 
Perelygin an entry visa and the delegation subsequently canceled its trip to Riga. 
 
Latvian Prime Minister Andris Berzins urged Moscow officials to change their 
stance, but the Russian foreign ministry considered Latvia's visa refusal to 
Perelygin "a deliberate and unfriendly move." (INTERFAX, 0823 GMT, 16 Aug 
01; FBIS-SOV-2001-0816, via World News Connection) The deputy director of 
the Russian foreign ministry's Information and Press Department, Boris 
Malakhov, announced that "appropriate retaliatory steps will be taken on the 
basis of the principle of reciprocity." (INTERFAX, 0734 GMT, 16 Aug 01; FBIS-
SOV-2001-0816, via World News Connection) A Latvian diplomat stated that the 
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move was made in accordance with Latvian legislation, was not politically 
motivated and should have no impact on Russian-Latvian relations. Meanwhile, 
Moscow authorities maintain that the visa denial was a result of the strong 
influence of Latvian nationalist circles. Latvian officials say that there have been 
cases when Russia did not issue entry visas for Latvian citizens.  
 
Russia's exaggerated focus on these issues is no surprise. It has long been a 
Russian tactic to attempt to discredit the Baltic governments; now that their 
membership in NATO becomes increasingly likely, Russia has few other cards to 
play. Moscow most probably will continue to exploit any issue in which the Baltic 
states can be deemed nationalistic and their leaders portrayed as unable to 
resolve ethnic problems. Since the OSCE has been monitoring Estonia (at 
Russia's request) it has found invalid most of Russia's claims of human rights 
violations against ethnic Russians in Estonia. Accordingly, the OSCE is likely to 
end its mission there soon. 
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